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Drafi Resolution
on the resumption of French nucleor tests in the Pacifu
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the 13th June 1995 decision of the President of France to resume France's nuclear tests in
the South Pacific in order to ensure the safety, security and reliability of its deterrent forces and to com-
plete current work on the development of a test simulation;(ii) Aware that this decision concerns a maximum of eight tests between September 1995 and the end
of May 1996 at the latest;
(iri). 
. 
Noting mal on llth V7y.l!9! qll sta1e9 having- signed the non-proliferarion freaty unanimously
decided to extend this freaty indefinitely and that the -five nuclear poweis, including Frarice, committeit
themselves to sign the comprehensive test ban freaty by 1996 and, in the meantirie, to exercise some
restraint with respect to nuclear tests;
(iv) Aware that France has vowed.tosign the comprehensive test ban treaty at the end of 1996, stating
its commitrnent to a " zero option " in the ffeaty, excluding even small-scale iests of one kiloton or less;-(u) Recognising that only very few specialists have at their disposal the scientific and technical means
needed to assess whether these additional nuclear underground teits are indispensable;(ri) Considering that this autonomous decision was taken notwithstanding the existence of a self-impo-
sed moratorium on nuclear-testing which had been observed by France, Ruisia, Ore United Kingdom ind
the United States since 1992;
(ry{ 
.R*ogtsing that the moratorium on French nuclear tests, announced by President Mitterrand in
1992, intemrpted the existing nuclear test progmmme;
(viii) Accepting that France wishes to ensure that its deterrent force is fuIly effective in advance of its
commitmentto.sign the nuclear test ban treaty, but nevertheless considering ihat its decision could create
political conditions which endanger the signature of such a treaty in the autumn of 1996;(ix) Considering that unilateral decisions on issues which can be considered vital for the defence and
security of Europe could impede the development of a common European security and defence policy;(x) 
. 
Consideri^ng that it is increasingly less lilely that, within the framework of a common European
security and defence policy,-nuclear forces would lie an asset for the defence and security of the natibnal
territory of only one particular country;
(xi) 
- 
Wclcoming France's initiatives to start a fundamental discussion with some of its Ewopean partners
on the rOle of the French nuclear forces in a common security and defence policy;
(,ud. Recalling its Recommend anon 564 on the r61e and future of nuclear weapons adopted on I 6th June
1994;
(xiii). Considering $4 the French decision to hold a number of nuclear tests might encourage those states,
which are not official nuclear 
-weapon states, but which are bying to acquire luch weapo-ns or have theability to assemble them quickly, to proceed with their efforts tb achieve i nuclear capability;
@v) Noting ttrat it is essential to maintain a basic European solidariry as regards security and defence
matters;
(n) 
-Profoundly concerned that France's unilateral decision to proceed with nuclear tests without prior
consultation may. have regr^ettable political consequences for the cohesion of the European poliiy to
promote non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
@il Noting that both the British and French nuclear forces could play a r6le in maintaining peace on theEuropean continent and participate in the security of the EuropeanUriion if there is a potdcal will to do
so;
(ruif).Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and
Doctrine which has confirmed many points of convergence in the assessments made by the two countries,
and noting that both countries wish to continue this work which should lead to a new iapprochement;
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(niii)Noting that France has proposed to start a dialogue with Germany on the possibilities of concerted
b"t".."r." iiorder to protect itreir future common exiitence and to create a corlmon sftategic area;
(xix) Stressing the need for a European doctrine of nuclear deterrence as long as nuclear weapons have
iiot ir"", aboliihed worldwide, whil6 at the sarne time sfressing that this doctrine needs to be reconsidered
and reformulated now that the 'o rulss of the game " mutually accepted during the cold war period no lon-
ger apply;
(xx) Noting that the proposed dialogue on the r6le of French nuclear weapons in a Furopean P.cY.y a4
b"f"r." pofiEy should'inciude such slbjects as doctrine, strategy and common vital interests which should
be protected,
Asrs rtm FnrNcIr Govenmrmvr
l. To halt or reduce the number of nuclear tests as a gesture of good faith and as evidence of its
commitment to the achievement of a worldwide nuclear test ban in autumn 1996;
2. To intensifi discussions with the British Government with a view to enabling co-operation on their
nuclear forces and consider in what way these forces can be integrated into a common European security
and defence policy;
3. To extend the proposal to start a dialogue with Germany on thg possibilities of concerted deterrence
to include the other rirember states of WEU In order to proteci not only their common future existence but
also to create a common strategic area.
4
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The French Presidential candidate, Mr.
Jacques Chirac, had undertaken to resume nuclear
testing, should that prove necessary, to ensure the
reliability of the French deterrent. On 13th June
1995, as President of the French Republic, Mr.
Chirac announced the resumption of nuclear tests
by France; this was to be a final series of eight
tests between September 1995 and May 1996.
The President of the French Republic linked this
resumption to the signing of the treaty on a total
ban on nuclear tests. This decision came after a
moratorium of more than three years decided by
the previous French President, Frangois Mitter-
rand, on 8th April 1992. On 5th September, the
first test, Thetis, of 20 kt took place. This event
rekindled the debate on French nuclear tests. To
understand fully what nuclear tests are and what is
at stake for France, it is necessary to recall the
events leading up to them.
II. Backgroand
2. For a better understanding of the present
French policy regarding nuclear testing, the
history of the development of France's nuclear
arsenal will be recalled succinctly in the following
paragtaphs'.
(a) From the sturt of nuclear research ta the first tests
3. In fact, French nuclear research began well
before the second world war 2. Since it is essential
to recall the political and scientific circumstances
allowing France to develop a nuclear weapon, the
historical part of this report will not therefore be
limited to the purely military aspect of the ques-
tion, but will also examine the aspects of civil
research which led to the production of such a
weapon in France.
l. Dominique Mongin, " La genBse de I'armement nucl6aire
frangais ", Universit6 de Paris I 
- 
Sorbonne l99l; W. Kohl,
" French nuclear diplomacy ", Princeton, Princeton Univer-
sity Press,.l97|; M. Duval, Yves [,e Baut, " L'arme nucl6aire
frangaise : pourquoi ? comment ? ", Paris, SPM, 1992; Spen-
cer Weart, " La grande aventure des atomistes frangais ",
Paris, Fayard, 1980; Yves Rocard, " La naissance de la bombe
atomique frangaise ", La Recherche, No. 141, February
r983.
2. Cohen Samy, " Les pdres de la bombe atomique fran-
gaise ", I'Histoire No. ll7, December 1988.
4. In the period between the two wars, nuclear
physics were already at a very advanced stage in
France thanks to the work of Pierre and Marie
Curie, Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie and IrEne Joliot-
Curie.
5. It should be recalled that in January 1939
two German scientists showed proof of the fission
of uranium under the action of neutrons. At that
moment, various countries had already started
research in this field. In France, it was the team of
Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie, Lew Kowarski and Hans
Halban of the Collbge de France that assumed
responsibility for this. Their very advanced work
brought proof, in the spring of 1939, of the possi-
bility of producing controlled or explosive atomic
energy starting from uranium. Their outstanding
work continued with the enrichment of uranium
into isotope 235 and the arrangement and dimen-
sions of moderators, but the declaration of war in
September 1939 and the German occupation of
France in June 1940 brought French atomic
research to a halt before the scientists could take
out patents.
6. Two members of the team, Kowarski and
Halban, then took refuge in England to be able to
continue their work in what was later known as
the Cambridge Group. There they took out several
patents, based in particular on the results obtained
in France. Others crossed the Atlantic and took
part, albeit indirectly, in the Manhattan program-
me, the aim of which was to achieve an atomic
weapon.
7. Before the end of the war, after the test in
Alamogordo on 18th July 1945, General de Gaulle
had already been informed by various scientists of
the progress made in American research in these
matters and of its military implications. Thus, in
autumn 1945, after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
explosions, he took the decision to create the Ato-
mic Energy Commissariat (AEC). On the day of
its official inauguration, lSth October 1945,
Joliot-Curie was appointed high commissioner
and Dautry, another leading research worker,
general administrator. This event was one of the
first to mark the resumption of French nuclear
research.
8. France thus opted to work on nuclear
fission immediately after Hiroshima but, for the
time being, for civilian purposes only.
9. Initially, the Atomic Energy Commissariat
sought to conclude several agreements with the
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United Kingdom concerning the recovery of
patents taken out by the French research workers
during the war. The AEC took like action for recog-
nition of the Joliot patents in the United States and
more than fifty other countries. The commissariat
persevered in attempting to claim recognition for
France's r6le in the history of atomic energy. This
was a means for France to affirm its place and r6le
among leading nations.
10. However, the instability of the Fourth
Republic in France after the war and the lack of
financial means were to hold back French nuclear
research which fell well behind that of the Ameri-
cans. To some extent, American aid also prevent-
ed France from turning towards the military appli-
cation of nuclear energy. The colonial conflicts in
which France became bogged down between
1946 and 1958 also seriously jeopardised the future
of the French atomic weapon. At that time, the
French army itself preferred the empire to the
bomb, counting on the American nuclear umbrella
in the event ofneed.
11. The cold war was also to have particular
consequences for the development of a French
nuclear weapon. The French scientific corps was
strongly influenced by the communist movement
which then had the backing of a quarter of the
electorate. Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie and other scien-
tists clearly gave their voices to the Soviet Union
and even campaigned against the Atlantic Allian-
ce and American nuclear weapons. Thus, Joliot-
Curie signed the Stockholm appeal on 19th March
1950 calling for an absolute ban on nuclear
weapons. In response to all these very strong posi-
tions, the government of Georges Bidault appoint-
ed Francis Perrin to lead the AEC in April 1950
instead of Joliot-Curie.
12. A first five-year plan for the development
of atomic energy prepared by F6lix Gaillard, a
member of the Pinay govemment (March 1952 to
January 1953) was mainly intended to find a
remedy for the French energy deficit. The plan
was to produce 50 kilos of plutonium a year
which, in theory would allow six to eight nuclear
bombs to be produced.
13. In the National Assembly, an amendment
tabled by the French communist party in July
1952 specifying that France would conduct no
military research in this matter was rejected by a
large majoriff'; the full impact of this event is
revealed by the fact that it left the way free for
military applications of the atom, even if it did not
give its defenders a free hand.
14. At European level, Germany was authoris-
ed to re-arm in the framework of the new WEU
3. Journal officiel de la R6publique frangaise, Assembl6e
nationale, d6bas,3rd July 1952; voting against the amend-
ment:518 to 100.
and of NATO in exchange for renouncing nuclear,
bacteriological and chemical weapons. This
re-armament was almost certainly one of the
reasons which made France decide to procure
nuclear weapons. Perhaps there was still fear of a
German military renaissance just a few years after
the end of the war. This was specifically the view
of the French military authorities which, for the
first time in 1954, suggested that France should
accede to nuclear power but provided that this
would take place in a European framework. In
October and in November of the same year, the
then Prime Minister, Pierre MendBs France, took
several decisions showing his interest in the mili-
tary applications ofnuclear energy a.
15. In 1955 and 1956, the revival ofEuropean
ideas through the creation of the European Ato-
mic Energy Community (Euratom) almost called
in question the future of the French nuclear
weapon. The proposal then was that Euratom
should have a monopoly of ownership of fissile
material and that its use should be strictly pacific
but, finally, in July 1956, France managed to
arrange for the treaty to leave full latitude to the
states in the area of military nuclear research.
Thus, Guy Mollet, then Prime Ministet atrirmed
France's freedom to choose in military nuclear
matters, while promising a five-year moratorium
before holding the flrst French test.
16. During the same period (February 1958),
the proposal was made to form a European
conventional and nuclear armaments pool by unit-
ing the efforts of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France and Italy s. It was meant as a res-
ponse to the Anglo-Saxon pool, which united
British and American military efforts, particularly
in the nuclear field. This agreement was even ini-
tialled by the ministers of defence of the three
states in question, but General de Gaulle put a
final stop to it at the Defence Council meeting on
17th June 1958. This episode perhaps also herald-
ed the problems now facing Europeans today.
17. Finally, one of the main factors that
influenced the French choice in this matter was
certainly the crisis in the Atlantic Alliance that
started in 1953 and was to end by France leaving
NATO.
18. This Franco-American difference within
the organisation stemmed from two sources: first,
a feeling of dependence on Americans in defence
matters and, more particularly, in the area of
4. An influential event in this connection was the meeting at
the Quai d'Orsay on 26th December 1954, where Pierre
Mendds France decided that France should pursue its research
under a co[lmon-core programme and retain the military
option.
5. The initiative was also known as the " armaments tri-
angle "; see studies by L. Nutti, E. Conze and C. Barbier,
Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique No. l-2, 1990.
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atomic weapons u; second, the American shategic
choice of massive retaliation which certain French
authorities saw as a change in the balance within
NATO. General Valluy, then French representative
in the NATO Standing Group, wrote at the time:
" Western defence centred around the nuclear
weapon is becoming wholly dependent on Ameri-
can wishes ... The only possible correction is the
formation by the European nations of a nuclear
arsenal to allow them to intervene in the new war-
fare with their own means; it would give them the
possibility of resuming a leading r6le in directing
the coa1ition " T.
19. The Franco-British Suez operation revealed
once and for all the dissent, within the alliance,
between the American protector and the other
member counffies. The absence of American soli-
darity in this crisis revealed clearly that there
could be very divergent interests. In France, the
feeling of dependence on Americans was expres-
sed no longer merely in regard to defence, but also
in regard to foreign policy. The French felt the
American attitude to be a kind of vassalage to the
extent that parliament affirmed the need to pos-
sess the nuclear bomb 8. Furthermore, the Soviet
threat to launch missiles on London and Paris in
response to the intervention which the USSR
opposed gave added importance to the debate.
20. After the Suez crisis, several decisions
were taken on nuclear matters and some concerned
the military aspect (nuclear warheads). On 5th
December 1956, a Committee for the Military
Applications of Atomic Energy was created
secretly; this committee provided for co-operation
between the Atomic Energy Commissariat and
senior military officials. On 5th October 1956,
there was an order for the establishment of a pro-
grarnme concerning vehicles of delivery. Finally,
a programme was outlined on 19th December
1956 for a future sfiategic nuclear bomber.
2I. Events speeded up in 1957 and Franco-
American relations deteriorated within the alliance.
ln nuclear matters, the French did not receive
from the Americans the same assistance as the
British which allowed them to explode their
H-bomb. The Prime Minister, F6lix Gaillard, was
6. At a press conference in April 1954, General de Gaulle
stated: " French governments have made our defence entire-
ly dependent on others, through our lack of atomic weapons,
over which we have given them a monopoly... without
requiring participation in plans and decisions in the atomic
war. " Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Volume 2,
Paris, Plon 1970.
7. Cited in Claude Delmas, Histoire politique de la bombe
atomique, Paris, Albin Michel, 1967 , pages 289-290.
8. The Rapporteur of the Defence Committee of the French
National Assembly even stated at the time that " The creation
of a nuclear force and thermonuclear national force... is now
fundamental to our military effort ". Journal officiel, Assem-
bl6e Nationale FranEaise, D6bats, 7th December 1956, page
5586.
already asserting France's independence of the
Americans in negotiations concerning the stock-
piling of nuclear weapons and the installation of
launching ramps for Thor and Jupiter rockets.
Following the same course, on 1lth April 1958,
he chose the date for the first French nuclear
explosion. At that time, however, the door was
still not closed to negotiations with the Americans.
22. The return of General de Gaulle after the
crisis of 13th May 1958 marked the end of French
indecision in these matters. The choices were
clear; at the meeting of the Defence Council on
17th June 1958, he confirmed the date of the first
French nuclear explosion and decided to accele-
rate the French nuclear prograrnme. In September
1958, he called for a sharing of nuclear know-how
and joint leadership with the alliance. For him, the
nuclear weapon was the spearhead of national
political independence. He considered it as the
only weapon capable of compensating for the
inferiority of armies; it would be an equalising
factor in relations between powers. It was also a
guarantee since it allowed France to have a deto-
nator in the event of the Americans hesitating to
resort to their nuclear weapons. But this weapon
was also first considered as a shield. Its use in
battle was envisaged as defensive to re-establish
balance.
23. As a result of these facts, certain observers
have been able to note that France's nuclear deci-
sions were reached more because of its allies than
because of its enemies e.
24. The production of a nuclear weapon, how-
ever, means carrying out nuclear tests to measlue
its power and reliability. The various aspects of
French nuclear tests will now be examined in the
following part of the present report.
(b) French nuclear tests in the Sahara
25. French nuclear tests in the Sahara were
held in two different sites named Reganne and In
Ecker.
(i) Reganne
26. The date set for France's first nuclear
explosion by General de Gaulle at the meeting of
the Defence Council on 17th June 1958 was the
beginning of 1960. The place chosen for this
experiment was the Sahara and, more precisely,
the Reganne oasis 700 km south of Colomb-
B6char, then an integral part of French Algeria 
'0.
This test, which was eventually to take place on
13th February 1960 at7.04 a.m., was then placed
9. Maurice Varsse, " France's atomic choice (1945-1958) ",
XX'sidcle, Revue d'Histoire, No. 36, 1992.
10. Reggane is situated in the Tanezrouf. Apart from the
base camp located on the plateau, the fuing range included an
ancillary base at Hammodia.
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under the responsibility of the Commandement
Interarm6es des Armes Sp6ciales (CIAS), com-
manded by General Ailleret. On 16th March the
French Government announced: o'The power of
the nuclear device tested at Reggane on 13th
February was between 60 and 70 kt and the result
of the explosion was particularly satisfactory. "
27. The success of the atmospheric test " Ger-
boise bleue " informed the world that France was
joining the very restricted nuclear power club (the
United States, USSR, Great Britain).
28.. The test present^ed an o.pportunity for
various measurements for obtaining the maxi-
mum scientific data including nuclear analysis,
ultra-rapid photographs and samples for radio-
chemical analysis of the residue of the explosion.
The military authorities made a large number of
observations on the effects of the explosion. In co-
operation with the national meteorological service
and the AEC, they had also verified the radiolo-
gical securiry of the operation.
29. Shortly after this frst test, the AEC pro-
posed testing the emergency device, available on
the flring range, should an incident have prevent-
ed the successful conduct of the test. The French
state welcomed this proposal. Thus on lst April
1960, before the high temperatures of the Sahara
in summer, the second air test, named " Gerboise
blanche ", was carried out.
30. Two other tests were carried out on the
Reggane range, " Gerboise rouge " on 27th
December 1960 and " Gerboise verte " on 25th
April 1961.
3 1. These frst four French tests, however, were
held in an atmosphere of international tension.
This was a period in which the other nuclear
powers (United States, USSR and Great Britain)
had decided on a moratorium (since November
1958). Public opinion in several countries was
also very vociferous against the tests and their
radioactive fallout. Moreover, the virulence of
certain international protests at the time was not
very different from that of today.
32. As a result, France then took the decision to
conduct tests underground towards the end of
1961. To that end, it was decided to change site.
(ii) In Ecker
33. The place chosen for these underground
tests was In Ecker in the Hoggar, some 150 km
north of Tamanrasset and 2 000 km south of
Algiers. In Ecker is in the mountainous area of
Thn Afela which was chosen for the special density
of its rocky substructure. It was then called the
Oasis Military Test Centre.
34. Thirteen tests were held there up to 16th
February 1966, but the 1962 Evian Agreements
and the independence of Algeria called in ques-
tion the prolongation of tests in this area; France
had to leave the Sahara before 1967. Thus, after
decontamination and cleaning the sites, they were
returned to the Algerian state on 1st and 15th
January 1967 . France then had to find other sites
suitable for such tests.
(c) French nuclear tests in the Podfu
(i) Characteristics of the test sites on the Mururoa
and Fangataufa atolls
35. The sites chosen were the French Polyne-
sian atolls, of Mururoa and Fangataufa (atolls of
the Tiramutu) I' in the South Pacific, still known
as the Pacific Test Centre. From the geographical
point of view, Mururoa, the largest of the two
atolls, with a perimeter of 60 kilometres, was
40 kilometres away from Fangataufa. These two
Polynesian territories are part ofFrance, although
they are some 20 000 kilomefres away from the
metropolis.
36. Here it should be recalled that these atolls,
although far distant from metropolitan territory
are associated with France. Their history has been
linked to that of France since the beginning of the
last century. Confirmation of the wish of the inha-
bitants of French Polynesia to accede to the status
of overseas territory was the subject of a vote in
1958 following a 1956 national programme law
proposing that they move progressively towards
independence (they then decided to link their des-
tiny to that of France) 12. Recent voting corro-
borates this attachment to France in spite of sepa-
ratist movements which are still in the minority.
Even if these tests are not appreciated by the local
population any more than that of the metropolitan
territory this in no way calls in question the terri-
tory's link with France. The territorial assembly
composed of locally elected representatives
which handles administrative questions was,
moreover, consulted by the French authorities
about the nuclear tests. The French presence is an
important economic advantage for the population
of the region. The standard of living of the inhabi-
tants is similar to that of Australians, for example,
which is approximately four times higher than the
regional average.
37. The test sites were created on 21st Septem-
ber 1962 and the Direction des Centres d'Experi-
mentation Nucl6aires (DIRCEN) was made res-
11. These atolls are 1 200 km from Tahiti and more than
4 000 km from any major city on the shores of the Pacific.
12. T:he atolls form part of French Polynesi4 which has the
status of overseas territory. Amcle 7 4 of the French Consti-
tution makes special arrangements for them in view of their
specific interests within the overall interests of the Republic.
The representative of the govemment is a high commissio-
ner. He is responsible for national interests, administrative
control and respect of laws in the territory. The territory is
administered freely by elected representatives.
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ponsible for organising and exploiting the range.
The DIRCEN was a joint service 
- 
AEC body; the
military authorities handled support operations
and the AEC prepared and carried out measures
for the functioning of the test device that the
Direction des Applications Militaires had worked
out in the metropolis. All the necessary infra-
sfucture for tests was installed and even a harbour
channel was created at Fangataufa which did not
have one.
38. Hao,450 kilometres north-west of Mururoa,
was chosen as advanced support base. Consider-
able modernisation work was ca:ried out there for
this purpose. The rear base and command were set
up in Tahiti. Moreover, a large number of peri-
pheral posts were installed on surrounding atolls
to verify the conditions of security (meteorologi-
cal, radiological and biological monitoring posts).
Finally, various services were created for environ-
mental and scientific monitoring purposes.
39. These sites were chosen by the French state
for the different types of testing because of their
relative isolation and geological characteristics.
40. These uninhabited atolls are a long way
from the main maritime or air routes and several
hundred kilometres from the nearest inhabited
areas. These characteristics made the site suitable
for air tests. Nevertheless, as additional protection
for air and maritime navigation in the region, an
exclusion zone (adangerous zone with a 200 nau-
tical mile radius) was defined and activated before
frings above ground.
4L. Moreover, the basaltic sub-stratum covered
by a calcareous, or hardened dolomite, sffatum of
some 300 metres produced by the aggregation of
coral residue was considered suitable fbr under-
ground tests. The high density of basalt allows
nuclear tests to be confined and thus avoids any
leak of radioactivity. From a technical point of
view, in one-tenth of a second, the explosion pro-
vokes the formation of a spherical cavity contain-
ing several thousand tons of melted rock, with a
high silicium content, trapping most of the radio-
activity resulting from the firing. Basalt is also a
good test medium since the speed of circulation of
water caused by the geothermic flow caused by
the explosion is very low in a volcanic environ-
ment. Due to their atrinity with the environment
(radioactive matter is set in lava), their low solu-
bility and the natural decline of radioactivity, the
matter remains trapped at a very $eat depth and
progressively loses its radioactivity. For that rea-
son, the concenffation of plutonium and caesium
in the Mururoa lagoon is a thousand times less
than the threshold tolerated for water normally
consumed in the United States.
(ii) Characteristics of the tests conducted
42. The first tests conducted at the Mururoa
and Fangataufa sites were affnospheric. Test series
were grouped in order to take advantage of
favourable meteorological conditions. Strict mili-
tary security measures were taken; a strong aero-
naval force (the Alpha force 
- 
an aircraft-carrier,
escort vessels, etc.) was stationed on the spot.
Meteorological forecasts were also made in view
of their importance for tests above the ground; the
general direction of wind at high altitudes is of
special importance in these circumstances.
Various samples were taken systematically after
each flring.
43. The flrst fring at Mururoa took place on a
barge on 2nd July 1966. The six tests in the first
series were as follows:
- 
four barge tests (in which the load and
measuring instruments were on a barge
some 2 000 m from the advanced record-
ing post);
- 
one balloon test (a complex technique
whereby the device is carried by balloon
to an altirude high enough to limit the
radiological effects on the ground while
allowing the effective conduct of testing);
- 
one test of a device dropped from an
aircraft as an operational test for the
Mirage IV bomb.
4. Much scientific data was gathered on the
occasion of these various tests, in particular
thanks to the chemical diagnosis (functioning of
the chemical explosive) and the nuclear diagnosis
(reconstitution of the very high dynamic garnma
flow, some 15 decades, and of very short duration,
a few hundred nanoseconds).
45. The first thermonuclear test was conducted
at the Fangataufa atoll on24th April 1968.
46. After 41 tests in the atmosphere, under-
ground tests were started in June 1975. The
advantage of this technique was to allow tests to
be conducted throughout the year, unlike tests in
the atmosphere which have to be conducted
during the southern winter in order to have favou-
rable meteorological conditions.
47. After each test, an oblique small-diameter
borehole directed towards the fring cavity allow-
ed a few fragments of vitrified rock to be reco-
vered, analysis of which completed the measure-
ments obtained at the time of firing. Considerable
progress was made with effect from 1976 in
regard to both the concept and taking of measure-
ments which were now more accurate and com-
plete than those made in the atmosphere.
48. The first underground tests were initially
condueted from the coral fringe above water from
derricks such as those used in the oil industry.
With effect froml979, however, it was decided to
move on to tests in the central zone of the lagoon.
Independently of the increase in the potential
9
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number of tests that could be conducted in this
manner, it was thus also possible to avoid undue
packing down of the terrain that might cause dif-
ficulties, particularly in the event of storms. The
flrst test of this type took place on 10th April 1 98 1
and with effect from 1987 all tests were carried
out in the central zone; this is still the technique
employed today.
49. In all, 41 tests in the atmosphere and 134
tests in boreholes in the atolls (from the edge of
the atolls or in the central zone) were conducted
between 1960 and 1991 on Mururoa and Fanga-
taufa. Added to those in the Sahara, France had
thus conducted a total of 192 tests up to 1992.
(d) Securiy measures and internatiannl manitoing
50. In the following paragraphs, only tests
conducted on Mururoa and Fangataufa will be
examined.
51. From the outset, the effects of nuclear tests
have been monitored extremely closely. Apart
from the security measures observed during each
flring and already mentioned previously, various
studies and research have been conducted at both
national and international level in order to moni-
tor the effects on the environment.
52. The IPSN (Institut de Protection et de S0ret6
Nucl6aire) each year publishes a repoft on the
analyses and measurements made which it trans-
mits to the Scientific Committee of the United
Nations. Validation of the laboratory procedures
and recognition of the competence of experts and
engineers responsible for measuring radioactivity
must be achieved by cross-campaigns between
the scientists of the DIRCEN and the laboratory
of the National Meteorological Bureau, the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Pro-
tection Office of the Minisfiry of Health (OPRI)
and on occasion with the laboratories of various
countries.
53. At national level, the French Government
produces an annual report on the monitoring of
the environment and the radiological situation.
ffis report is distributed to elected representa-
tives of French Polynesia and to the Scientific
Committee of the UnitedNations on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). Furthermore,
during tests in the atmosphere, several thousand
biological samples have been taken and atmos-
pheric aerosols have been analysed, the results
being sent to UNSCEAR. This revealed no speci-
fic anomaly. Several publications, visits and mis-
sions have always allowed some transparency in
the conditions in which tests are conducted. Led
by the DIRCEN and the AEC, the overall know-
ledge gathered at the Polynesian sites in the last
25 years regarding science and the environment
will be passed on to the international community.
54. A particularly close watch is kept on the
civilian population in the Pacific. The global
doses of radiation they have received in the last
three years are below the limits fixed for the
public (the average natural exposure in Polynesia
is I mSv and the public should not be exposed to
more than 5 mSv). Regular radiological monitor-
ing of foodstuffs in Polynesia has been conducted
since 1975; no anomaly has been noted. Verifica-
tion is even more extensive on the sites extending
to a broad cross section of living foodstuffs (shell-
fish, fish, poultry, coconut) and certain marine
vegetation (algae and plankton) which are apt to
concenffate radioactive particles in suspension in
the water. These various studies of products desti-
ned directly or indirectly for consumption show
that the level of artificial radioactivity ingested by
the population of the region is still below 0.1 mSv.
This quantity is one thousandth of natural exposure
and can have no consequence of any kind on
human health.
55. TWo reference stations in Tahiti and Mururoa
enable the physical environment of the sites to be
monitored. They follow ambient radiation, radio-
activity in the air and in rainwater. Sediment
immediately surrounding former 0 points of the
Mururoa and Fangataufa airborne tests still has
residual artificial radioactivity. Radioactive
concentrations in the water of the lagoons, even if
higher than those of the Pacific, are still infini-
tesimal and do notjeopardise undersea fauna and
flora (they are identical to those of the Baltic sea).
Finally, artificial atmospheric radioactivity in
Mururoa and Fangataufa is still below one millionth
of ambient natural radioactivity; like the other
measurements, they represent no danger for per-
sons on the site or inhabitants of the region.
56. However, outside verifications have also
been conducted. In this respect, France has agreed
to the proposals made by outside bodies or inter-
national authorities. This was the case for the mis-
sion led by Mr. Haroun Tazietr in 1982 and the
foreign scientific mission led by Professor Atkin-
son, Director of the Christchurch National Labo-
ratory (New Zealand) in 1983. Similarly, the
French Commander Cousteau led a mission in this
region in 1987; like others, he concluded that the
tests conducted at Mururoa and Fangataufa had no
notable effect on the populations or the environ-
ment of the region. Finally, experts of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency also made compa-
rative measurements of radioactivity during a stay
in Mururoa in 1991. The results obtained conflr-
med the findings of the various missions. Other
foreign laboratories of scientific renown also took
part. There was a further series of verifications in
1994. Identical checks will also be made at the
conclusion ofthe last French nuclear test series.
57. Finally, it is necessary to mention the scien-
tific reports of some countries which have been
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the strongest opponents of France. First, there was
a report commissioned by the Australian Prime
Minister, Paul Keating, from the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation.
The scientists who prepared this report concluded
on 16th August last, at a meeting with the press,
that the impact of the tests on the health of people
in the Pacific region would probably not be signi-
ficant. Should there be any leakage, a danger
which the scientists minimised, they beteved it
would be possible that the local environment
might be affected. The impact would be greater on
the atoll and would diminish with distance'3. The
other scientific report comes from New Z,ealand
and, more specifically, the External Assessments
Bureau. lts content has not yet been revealed offi-
cially by the head of the Wellington Government,
John Bolger, but it is believed that the rate of
radioactivity in the French atolls in question is
even lower than that in New Zealand.
58. Nevertheless, French nuclear tests were
resumed in a relatively pernicious international
atrnosphere which should now be examined.
III. Aspects of the international dispute over
French nuchar testing
59. Objections to French nuclear testing stem,
among others, from states which consider they are
concerned by French tests or from international
organisations or non-governmental organisations.
They are sometimes intermingled.
60. What has to be determined initially is the
nature of these objections; in other words, what
are the true arguments behind these objections?
Here one should try to rise above any conffoversy
which might encumber the consffuctive outcome
of this analysis.
6I. The arguments put forward are often mixed
but may be classified in two main categories:
conventional ecological arguments and political
arguments. Only the former can find a relatively
stable juridical basis.
(a) Tests and the environment
62. The main ecological argument is based on
the legislation governing cross-border pollution.
lnternational law on the environment can offer
protection to states which are victims of pollution
caused by another state. In the case in point, envi-
ronmental damage to certain states would appear
to be caused by the French nuclear tests. Interna-
tional law has several well-established standards
to defend states which are victims of pollution
13. Comments reported in Le Monde, lTth August 1995 in
an article entitled " Australian and New Zealand scientists
minimise the impact of French nuclear tests on the environ-
ment ".
caused by another state (cross-border pollution).
The legal basis for such an allegation can be
found in principle 21 of the Stockholm Conven-
tion which stipulates that states have the obliga-
tion to ensure that the activities under their confrol
do not jeopardise the environment of other states.
This principle has been confirmed in other
conventions and international agreements such as
the Montego Bay convention on the law of the
sea, the Rio declaration, the World Charter of
Nature and decisions of the International Court of
Justice.
63. The various samples and measurements of
the environment examined previously can prove
the existence of no significant degradation of the
environment or the atolls in the region. As long as
the states concerned have no tangible scientific
proof, it appears to be impossible for them to use
this international legal standard to call a halt to
French nuclear tests. Finally, it seems doubtful
that countries such as Australia and New Zealand
located several thousand kilomefres away from
the atolls can be subjected to any kind of cross-
border nuclear pollution.
64. Moreover, on 23rd September, New Zea-
land's suit was dismissed through lack ofjurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice which it
had requested to reopen the question of nuclear
tests in l914,buton the new basis ofunderground
tests Ia; the 1974 decision concerned tests in the
atmosphere by France and the Pacific and their
consequences on the environment. This matter
had already been dismissed since France at the
time had officially given up this type of test. The
International Court of Justice has therefore not
given an opinion on the substance in these two
cases but these events clearly show that it is diffi-
cult for the time being to condemn a state which
carries out nuclear tests.
65. Yet another argument prolongs the previous
one by taking up a principle that is at the very
basis of international law of the environment
today to the effect that one does not inherit the
land of one's grandparents but one borrows it
from one's children. The countries that object
base their criticism on the future consequences of
these tests. For them, the presence in the sub-sfrata
of radioactive matter is a danger for future gene-
rations in addition to being a potential danger for
the present one in the event of an earthquake or
collapse of the atolls because of their being under-
mined by the multiplicity of tests. Certain interna-
tional legal standards, moreover, call upon states
to abstain from any activity, the future conse-
quences of which they ignore. At the moment,
these are mainly conventions, declarations or
agreements and their binding force is still relative.
14. Ibid, Note 15, International Court ofJustice, on nuclear
tests.
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66. France meets this argument with allega-
tions that the risk is minimal, controls are effected
regularly and radioactivity which is present at a
depth of something like one kilomeffe below the
surface will diminish with the years. France
believes that the speed of water movement in the
basalt rock (which is not very permeable) is not
enough to allow radioactive substances liable to
affect human health to rise to the surface. Its view
is that at the moment when water which has been
in contact with the radioactive matter in the sub-
soil regains the surface, its rate of radioactivity
will have diminished to such an extent that it will
no longer present any danger for mankind.
67. But the spirit that dominates certain argu-
ments is perhaps the relativisation of scientific
knowledge. However just, science cannot predict
the future and decide the future consequences of a
persistently dangerous substance whose long-
term effects cannot be known. Too many parame-
ters are in play for one to be able to give a reaso-
nable answer to such a prospective analysis.
Precedents add grist to the deep conviction ofcer-
tain opponents of the tests; indeed, from the end
of the 1940s until the sixties, the Americans, like
the Russians, conducted scientific tests under the
aegis of the most eminent institutes on the effects
of radioactive material on human beings. These
facts, now well-known thanks to the declassifica-
tion of certain documents in the two countries for
various reasons, clearly show how ignorance of
certain consequences of radioactive material can
lead to serious disturbances to the human orga-
nism. Given the state of their knowledge at the
time, eminent research workers were convinced
that they could master most of the consequences
of their acts. While not wishing thereby to reduce
mankind to powerlessness (any human activity
involves an element of risk), a critical mind
should also accompany scientists when they make
certain affirmations. It is perhaps this lack of a cri-
tical mind that calls into question for some the so-
called innocuity of nuclear tests. How can one be
reasonably convinced of the absence of future
danger of radioactive substances buried several
hundred metres underground, even if this ground
is formed by the hardest rock?
(b) The French mnraloriam
68. On 8th Apil1992, President Frangois Mit-
terrand, through his Prime Ministet announced
the suspension of French nuclear tests that year.
Thus started the French moratorium on nuclear
tests which was renewed several times, finally to
be suspended by the new French President,
Jacques Chirac, in 1995. President Mitterrand's
announcement came only a few days before the
start of what was to have been the annual test
series. The decision was intended to encourage
worldwide nuclear disarmament and to accomplish
a symbolic act which was supposed to encourage
non-proliferation.
69. Clearly, one can question the legal validity
of such a moratorium at international level. It was
a unilateral act by a state committed to it for as
long as anticipated in its declaration; thus, any
violation of this unilateral undertaking can be
challenged by any other state concerned. The
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
in this matter is firm and unswerving rs.
70. The French moratorium was subsequently
renewed when in a televised speech on 25th Octo-
ber 1993 Frangois Mittenand committed France
in this respect for as long as he would be Head of
State, i.e. until May 1995. Throughout that period,
France abided by its undertaking; in the words of
the President, France reserved the possibility of
resuming tests after May 1995.
(c) The comprehensive test ban trealy
7l. France is one of the thirry-seven states par-
ties to the Disarmament Conference which, in
August 1993, decided unanimously to negotiate a
complete test ban treaty. The main conditions for
such a treaty were its universality and the effecti-
veness of guarantees it would gant the signatory
states. The work of the Disarmament Conference
in negotiating the treaty should be completed by
the end of l996.It was stated at the NPT confe-
rence that before the freaty came into force, the
nuclear powers should exercise the greatest
discretion. France then indicated that it did not
exclude a possible resumption of tests before
signing a test ban treaty. Certain commentators,
however, then remarked that such conduct was
contrary to the principle of goodwill that should
preside over all international negotiations'u.
According to this principle, if the conduct of one
of the parties to the negotiation was contrary to
the aim and purpose of the treaty being negotia-
ted, such conduct would deprive the negotiation
of its substance. They pointed out that the French
reservation was contrary to the undertaking that
was being negotiated by the various states and
that one could not reasonably accept in good faith
a conduct that was contrary to future commit-
ments. In their view, France would call the nego-
tiations into question.
15. Permanent International Court of Justice, Eastern
Greenland case, PCU, Ser. A/B, No. 53, 68 (1933); lnterna-
tional Court ofJustice, Nuclear Tests case (Australia vs France),
ICJ, Rep. 253 (1974); see also S. Carbone, " Promise in
international law: a confirrnation ofis binding force ", lnter-
national Yearbook l.L.1975, pages 166-172; J-P. Jacques,
" A propos de la promesse unilat6rale ", M6lange Reuters,
1981, pages 327-345.
16. Principle found inter alia in Article 3l.l of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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(d) The compatibilily oltests and the Euralom treaty
72. In regard to the French nuclear tests, other
criticism arose in Europe regarding a possible
violation by France of the Euratom Treaty of 1957 .
Article 34 of this treaty stipulates that in the event
of " particularly dangerous experiments " any
member state is obliged frst to obtain the Com-
mission's opinion. Furthermore, if " such experi-
ments are liable to affect the territories of other
member states "o this opinion is binding. Those
who criticised France in this respect pointed out
that 900 kilomeffes away from the test cenffe is the
Pitcairn island inhabited by 85 British subjects.
73. The dilemma is that the Euratom Treaty
concerns in principle only civil nuclear questions
but it is noted that the Commission is also compe-
tent in health protection in connection with the
security provisions, whatever may be the origin of
the explosion. Ttvo complaints were made to the
Commission in this respect at the beginning of
summer 1995. Opinions differ regarding the res-
ponsibility of the Commission in this matter.
74. This issue caused a dispute between the
Commission and the Parliament. In a spirit of
appeasement and to avoid a tussle with the French
authorities, the President of the Commission, Mr.
Santer, explained to the European Parliament that
the information available was not enough to reach
an opinion ''. This very diplomatic answer did not
prevent Mr. Santer, however, from recalling that
the Commission had no competence to give an
opinion on the political or military expediency of
the French decision. The President of the Com-
mission recalled that he would make fulI use of
Articles 35 and 36 of that treaty which allow
important technical information to be obtained; he
undertook to be very active in this respect. In this
sense, on 6th September he urged France to prov-
ide him with guarantees concerning the security
of these tests and a team of European experts was
sent to the Mururoa atoll.
75. On 22nd October, the European Commis-
sion concluded that the tests under way did not
pose a perceptible risk of significant exposure to
radiation to workers or the population and that
Article 34 of the Euratom treaty did not therefore
apply. According to Mr. Santer, a delegation of
the Commission experts which had visited Muru-
roa found that the level of radiation was 10 micro
Sieverts as opposed to the allowed exposure level
of 5 000 micro Sieverts.
(e) The lnck of European concertation
76. More generally, what was hard to accept by
France's European partners was the lack of prior
consultation. There was no discussion within the
Union of the unilateral decision to resume tests.
France's unilateralism was seen by some to
conflict with its words about co-operation and
European integration, particularly in defence mat-
ters. Whetherjustified or not, such an attitude was
bound to upset the susceptibilities of certain coun-
tries of the Union which have always been oppos-
ed to nuclear weapons. Thus, a proposal made by
the French political authorities at a later stage to
Europeanise its deterrent force was open to suspi-
cion, even if this matter is a question of great
importance for the introduction of a common
defence.
(f) European and internntianal reactian
77. The resumption of nuclear tests by France
did not therefore fail to arouse some quite sharp
reactions among partners and also at world
level ". It is not necessary to revert to the opposi-
tion manifested in the European Parliament led
mainly by socialist, communist and ecological
groups.
78. Reactions among European states were
very diverse. The United Kingdom remained rela-
tively neutral and Germany, in the person of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, while recalling that his
country did not have the same appreciation of
nuclear matters as France, specified that he in no
way wished to call in question Franco-German
friendship which was the most precious outcome
of the post war period'e. The United Kingdom
refused any condemnation 20. Other European
comments were not so lenient; newcomers to the
Union (Austria, Finland and Sweden) and certain
founder members such as Belgium, Italy or the
Netherlands showed no mercy in their reactions.
The Swedish Minister of Culture, Margot Wall-
strom, even marched alongside Polynesian pro-
testors for independence on 3rd September.
79. Reactions at international level were also
diverse. In the Asia-Pacific zone, criticism was
almost unanimous. It is understandable that coun-
tries such as Japan should be particularly sensitive
about such events. New Zealand and Australia
adopted an extremely critical attitude towards
France. South American countries such as Chile
also protested vigorously. On the other hand, the
United States and Russia only expressed regrets.
China, which is still holding nuclear tests, merely
took note of the French tests.
18. See for example the Financial Times, 3rd October 1995
" French N-test prompts wave of criticism " or Le Figaro, 3rd
October 1995 " L,es regrets de l'dtranger ".
19. For more details of Chancellor Kohl's arguments, see the
article by B. Bollaert " L'ind6fectible soutien de Helmut
Kohl " in Le Figaro, 7th September 1995.
20. See The Times, Tth September 1995 " Rifkind refuses tojoin in the condemnation ".
13
17. Financial Times, 7th September 1995.
DoCUIvD}{T 1488
IV The resumption of French nuclear tests
m 1995
80. According to the decision of the President of
France, nuclear tests in the South Pacif,rc have been
resumed to ensure the safety, security and reliabi-
lity of its deterrent forces and to complete current
work on the development of a test simulation.
81. In any event, it should be clearly noted that
the purpose of these tests is not to help to create
new weapons. This was made abundantly clear by
the President of the French Republic on 14th June
1995, when he announced the resumption of tests:
" It is not a question of increasing our armament,
but of ensuring maintenance. "
(a) The qualifuaian of the TN-75
82. The second test conducted byFrance on the
Fangataufa atoll on 2nd October 1995 at0.30 a.m.
Paris time was intended, according to the experts,
to qualify the TN-75 warhead. This deduction was
allowed by the conjunction of trvo factors: flrst,
the AEC stated that the test had released energy of
some 110 kt which corresponded to a qualifica-
tion firing of a nuclear warhead such as the TN-75
and, second, this test followed twenty-two others
conducted at different stages in the development
of the TN-75 and which had begun at the end of
the seventies. Six of these nuclear warheads are to
equip each M-45 sea-to-ground missile. These
weapons are to equip the new French nuclear mis-
sile-launching submarines of the Strategic Ocean
Force, which will replace the present Redoutable
class submarines, the first of which was decom-
missioned in 1991.
83. The frst submarine of this class, the Triom-
phant, will carry out its first patrol in the autumn
of 1996.Its commissioning will be followed by
that of the T6m6raire in 1999, the Vigilant which
most probably will be ready only after the anticip-
ated date of July 2001 and of a fourth unit that has
not yet been named, but which has little chance of
being operational before January 2005. Each of
the planned four submarines will carry sixteen of
this type of missile. It is estimated that the
construction of these four submarines will amount
to F 81.5 billion.
84. So far, the Redoutable class submarines
forming France's Strategic Ocean Force have
been equipped with M-4 missiles, each with six
TN-70 or TN-71 nuclear warheads of 150 kt.
Compared with these two nuclear warhead
models, the TN-75 is what the experts at the
Direction des Applications Militaires du Commis-
sariat d I'Energie Atomique (DAM-CEA) have
termed to be a major technological leap. This is a
particularly high-performing warhead, unprece-
dented in France, whose only equivalent is to be
found in the most sophisticated United States or
Russian weapons. Very few specific technical
data are available in view of the sensitivity of the
question which is classified " secret-ddfense ". It
is nevertheless known that the power of this ther-
monuclear device is some 100 kt and its load has
been miniaturised to the maximum. It is also ligh-
ter than previous weapons, which increases the
range of the missile. The new warhead has been
hardened, which makes it less vulnerable to elec-
tromagnetic impulses which might deregulate its
operation in-flight and it also has stealth features
to make it less detectable and is equipped with
more decoys to divert antiballistic defences. The
TN-75 draws the maximum from the latest tech-
nology in terms of weight, volume and power. As
a comparison, its power is six to ten times that of
the Hiroshima bomb (5 tons for a power of some
15 k0. The total weapons produced will be the
equivalent of a total destuctive power two thousand
times the power of that bomb.
85. The M-45 missile is intended to carry six
TN-75 warheads which is thus a considerable
technological progress compared with the M-4
missile. It has a range of 6 000 km (instead of 4-
5 000 km for the M-4). Its warhead is of a totally
new concept. It also has penetration capabilities
and decoy systems which allow it to divert the
electronic counter-measures of an enemy's
sophisticated defences 2r.
86. According to parliamentary sources, the
total cost of developing this weapon is estimated
atF 26 billion, which, added to the cost of the new
Strategic Ocean Force, gives a total of some
hundred billion francs.
87. In conclusion, the M-45 missile armed with
six TN-75 nuclear warheads is a far more sophis-
ticated weapon than its predecessors; its different
technical characteristics allow it to respond better
to the level of advancement reached by foreign
defences. This new weapon, destined to ensure
the major part of the French deterrent force until
approximately the year 2OIO, is therefore essen-
tial for maintaining the credibility of the French
deterrent force. It should be noted that the TN-75
was already designed when France intemrpted its
nuclear tests in 1992,without having been valida-
ted. Evidently, it cannot be said that this is an
increase in armaments but merely a question of
verifying the reliability of a weapon that existed
already.
(b) Verifuation of the reliabilily and the securily
of existing weapons
88. Another technical justification given by the
French Government is the absolute need for
maintenance for the nuclear weapons already in
t4
21. Le Monde, 19th October 1995.
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service 22. It is necessary to verify the ageing of
the various parts of these weapons. The 60 kiloton
test held on27th October last was certainly orga-
nised for this reason. Indeed its power corres-
ponded to no category of weapon in service ope-
rationally (bombers and all kinds of missiles). The
French Defence Ministry, moreover, declared that
this test was intended to guarantee the future safety
and retability of these weapons. At the presentjuncture of French scientific knowledge, only
tests can verify their state. Not to carry out such
verification tests might raise questions about the
reliability of these weapons and constitute a
serious danger should they have deteriorated.
89. It is anticipated that the simulation pro-
grarnme France is working to achieve will allow
this verification to be effected in laboratory
without any further testing; this will be examined
later in the present report.
(c) The simulation of nuclear tests
(the PALEN programme)
90. Part of the French final test campaign is
meant to provide the scientific information neces-
sary for achieving a simulation programme. This
programme is based on numerical simulation
backed by experience; for that, a few specific tests
are essential in order to isolate and provide ins-
tances of essential aspects revealed through full-
blown tests, which provide a back-up for the
simulation system.
91. An official French report 2' in December
1993 during the French moratorium considered
that ten more tests would still be useful for provi-
ding the information necessary for achieving the
prograrnme. In view of the scientific progress and
the international atmosphere in this respect, it
seems that today these estimates have been revi-
sed downwards.
92. One test, called Lycurgue, was conducted
before the French moratorium in 1992, which
allowed French physicians to learn more about the
phenomena of pollution. The present tests will
certainly also cover this very complex area of
sclence.
93. France has thus affirmed that it wished to
sign the treaty banning nuclear tests and also
maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent
force. The only way for it to reconcile these two
aims is to acquire the technology allowing nuclear
tests to be simulated and for that it is essential to
22. Address by the French Prime Minister to the IHEDN on
6th September 1995.
23. Assembl6e Nationale, Commission de la d6fense, rap-
port d'information no. 847, " La simulation des essais
nucldaires " (Defence Committee report on the simulation of
nuclear tests).
conduct a few more tests. As a necessary condi-
tion for obtaining this technology, these tests will
provide backing and validation for the various
processes linked with simulation, more specifi-
cally, lasers and numerical simulation means.
V. The rdle of France's nuclear vteapons
in the defence of Europe
94. There is a possibility that the reactions of
many EU-WEU member states to the French
nuclear tests will spark off a new debate on the
rdle of the French nuclear arsenal in the defence
of Europe. The recent proposals made by both the
President and the Prime Minister of France to
Europeanise the French nuclear forces, although
not entfuely new 2oo cannot be ignored by the Euro-
pean allies and they should also be linked with an
urgently-needed public debate on the r6le and
significance of nuclear weapons in the post-cold
war world.
95. Before any additional development, it is
necessary to fix the framework of the notion of
concerted deterrence. Indeed, it is not a matter of
" shared deterrence " which would mean others
also having a finger on the trigger. The President
of the French Republic alone retains this preroga-
tive. Nor is it a matter of " enlarged deterrence "
which would imply just extending the French
nuclear guarantee to Germany. Concerted deter-
rence means a dialogue between partners on
nuclear deterrent force procedures in addition to
an extension of guarantee r.
96. It should be recalled here that inJune 1992,
the WEU Assembly recommended that the Coun-
cil define " a European concept of the r6le of
nuclear weapons and developing consultations
between its members on the possibiliry of resor-
ting to such weapons 
'u ". A similar approach was
set out in Recommendation 540.
(a) The French proposal
97. After the resumption of its nuclear tests,
France proposed that its European partners, in the
framework of instituting a common defence, think
about the availability of its nuclear deterrence
forces. Thus, on 3 lst August 1995, President Chirac
said: 'o As it builds up its defence, the European
Union might wish the French deterrent to play a
r6le in this defence. " This idea was even more
clearly affirmed the same day by the French
24. President Mitterrand had already alluded to it in 7992.
25. Article by Daniel Vernet " France-OTAN: la fin des
tabous " (France-NATO: the ending of taboos), te Monde,
3lst October 1995.
26. Recommendation 517.
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Prime Minister, Alain Jupp6, who said that co-
operation in defence questions could no longer
overlook the nuclear dimension of our cofilmon
security. The Prime Minister was merely recalling
the concept of concerted deterrence he had al-
ready mentioned at the beginning of 1995 when
he was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the pre-
vious government.
98. The vague wording ofthe French proposal
needs to be spelled out, but it will inevitably raise
political, military and sffategic problems that will
have to be examined more closely. It should also
be noted that this proposal was made in the adverse
context of the resumption without consultation of
French nuclear tests. Such a poor view of this
resumption was taken by public opinion in many
countries that it would seem difficult for any
European country to voice its approval and
particularly for the United Kingdom and Germa-
ny, to which this proposal was clearly directed. It
should not be forgotten that in the latter counury
pacifist, anti-nuclear and ecological movements
are very influential. Moreover for historical rea-
sons, any discussion of defence questions in Ger-
many is still very delicate.Indeed, any immediate
approval would be taken by public opinion to
imply approval of the French tests. It would not fit
into the framework of this report to reveal the
deep-rooted intentions of the various European
partners towards France. Mention will merely be
made of the various tendencies and positions
adopted at official level in the countries concer-
ned, while the position of Germany and the
United Kingdom will be highlighted in more
detail.
(b) The Gennan reailion
99. The reaction of German political authori-
ties to the French proposal for concerted deterrence
could be characterised as polite and rather non-
committal. In fact, this is the best that could be
expected, bearing in mind a public opinion which
is very hostile to nuclear tests and nuclear wea-
pons in general. The German Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, in a statement at the
beginning of September, believed that the idea of
concerted deterrence was interesting and should
be discussed and studied closely. While not
constituting acceptance, this position allowed
Germany diplomatically to defer discussion of the
basic question underlying such an offer. Appa-
rently, the German Government tried to avoid any
statement which could harm the Franco-German
relationship which is passing through a sensitive
period due to other questions regarding European
integration.
100. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs
did not close the door on the French proposal
when he said that, after the end of the tests, Ger-
many would be prepared to reexamine the status
of French and British deterrent forces in order to
facilitate the creation of a European defence iden-
tity and give it credibility. Germany would not
make the first step, the ideas must come from
France. Having just hinted at its intentions for the
time being, France will have an important r6le to
play in this field.
101. Later, Minister Kinkel seemed to be hedg-
ing his position in this respect in an interview with
Le Figaro on 8th October 1995; " NATO is our
nuclear umbrella. We do not wish to have access
to the nuclear bomb, neither through the main
entrance, nor through the back door (concerning
concerted deterrence). For me, it is a question of
politeness to talk about it with our French friends ".
Once again, these remarks cannot be taken out of
the context of the growing opposition of
the German people to French tests in the South
Pacif,rc.
102. In the internal German debate on this issue,
the Social-Democrat opposition is strongly
opposed to the French proposal. Within the coali-
tion government itself, opinions diverge between
Europeans and Atlanticists; these differences of
view are represented by such influential persons
on the German political scene as Wolfgang
Schiiuble, Chairman of the Christian-Democrat
parliamentary group in the Bundestag, and Volker
Riihe, the present Defence Minister of Germany.
While the former believed he could not imagine a
future European security without a nuclear com-
ponent, the latter thought that Germany already
had the benefit of American protection and that
French nuclear weapons had always had direct
significance for European security 27. More radi-
cal opposition to any co-operation in this matter is
represented by Edmund Stoiber (close to Theo
Waigel, Finance Minister in Bonn and Chairman
of the Bavarian CSU), Minister-President of
Bavaria. Speaking to journalists in Bonn on22nd
September last, he said that the German Govern-
ment would not follow up the French proposal to
Europeanise the strike force.
103. Other important actors on the German poli-
tical scene voiced their interest in the French pro-
posal. Thus, Karl Lamers, Christian-Democrat
group spokesman on foreign policy in the Bun-
destag, said this was an opportunity to seize while
atrirming that concerted deterrence should be set
in the overall framework of Europe's common
foreign and security policy 
'z8. All agreed, howe-
ver, not to interpret the French offer as a proposal
to have a finger on the trigger; it was more a ques-
tion of reflecting on proposals for concerted stra-
tegy in the nuclear area.
27. Le Monde, 9th September 1995.
28. Le Figaro,22nd September 1995.
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104. If one wishes to understand what the Ger-
man reaction might be to the French proposal, it is
necessary to refer to the actual state of affairs in
the nuclear debate in Germany. As already noted
previously, there are strong anti-nuclear pacifist
and ecological lobbies in Germany, which are cer-
tainly very much against such a proposal. The
most radical of them are even opposed to any
form of nuclear use, be it civil or military. Some
also amalgamate the ban on producing nuclear
weapons imposed after the second world war'e
with the opening of a debate on a new nuclear
guarantee that could protect Germany.
105. Yet it must not be forgotten that this hostility
did not prevent Euromissiles being stationed on
German territory thus giving it the benefit of a
first nuclear guarantee. Likewise, it is recalled
that the supposed constitutional obstacles against
'o out-of-area " operations by German armed
forces were taken away by a decision of the Ger-
man constitutional court, thus enabling the
government to take the action which it deemed
necessary. Although the latter argument may not
herald an affirmative answer from Germany
regarding the French proposal, it nevertheless
indicates a certain flexibility in German attitudes.
106. Finally, a last factor that might be interest-
ing to recall in this respect is a historical event that
has already been mentioned in the flrst part of the
present report: the secret agreements on defence
questions and armaments, including nuclear ques-
tions, between France, Germany and Italy of
1 957-58 (Colomb-B6char, the agreement between
the Defence Ministers of Germany (Strauss) and
France (Bourgbs-Maunoury) on lst January 1957,
the protocol of 25th November 1957, including
Italy in addition and the agreement of 8th April
1958 concerning more particularly the building of
an isotope separation plant at Pierrelatte. The full
texts of these agreements were published only a
few years ago.
107. The framework for these co-operation
agreements was to be NAIO and WEU and their
aim was to harmonise the military concepts of
France and Germany concerning the organisation
and doctrines governing the use and armament of
their forces, with particular regard to areas of new
weaponry. The category of new weaponry allows
it to be thought that the negotiators at the time did
not exclude co-operation in the nuclear military
field. Emphasis was already laid at the time on the
existence of problems of a specifically European
nature and problems specific to European coun-
tries of the alliance, and this throws considerable
light on the reluctance of Bonn and Paris with
regard to NAIO's strategy. Doubts about the
29. The September 1954 London conference placed a ban on
the production of nuclear weapons on German territory and
in the 1954 Paris Agreements, Germany undertook not to
produce ABC weapons on its territory.
readiness of the United States to use its nuclear
means in the event of significant local hostilities
in Europe was an important factor in the wish to
reach agreement on this question.
108. The prevailing concept at the time was,
nevertheless, not to weaken NATO, even though
the purpose of this agreement was to face up to
American discrimination in nuclear matters
between members of NATO. Chancellor Adenauer,
in the words of Defence Minister Strauss, then
said he was quite prepared to join with France and
Italy in questions of aircraft, rockets and nuclear
weapons, which he believed the three countries
needed. Thus the protocol of 25th November
1957 clearly specified that co-operation would
give priority to aircraft, missiles and the military
applications of nuclear energy. However the
return to power of General de Gaulle on lst July
1958 put an end to these agreements and more
particularly their nuclear aspects.
109. These brief historical facts can in no way be
compared to the present French proposal concern-
ing concerted deterrence, be it in the content of
the agreements or the international context of the
time. It is nevertheless interesting to see how certain
questions persist throughout history. Reference is
made here to the specific problems of European
countries of the alliance which again seem to be
on the agenda in regard to the discussion of
concerted deterrence. It is also interesting to note
that the Germans have not always been opposed
to discussion of military nuclear problems.
110. The nature of the German answer will be
very important from a political point of view.
A positive answer would open the door to a Euro-
pean doctrine of deterrence in which not only
British but also French nuclear guarantees would
be extended to other countries. The fact that a
future common defence would be covered by a
concerted European deterrence would undoubt-
edly strengthen the political weight of Europe on
the international scene. lndeed, one cannot deny
the political impact of nuclear weapons in the
world today. Mention is sometimes made of the
equalising power of this weapon in that it allows a
country that possesses it to pull itself up to the
same level as the other countries that have it. It
cannot therefore be gainsaid that such a choice
would influence the CFSP instituted by the Maas-
tricht Treaty by strengthening Europe's authority
vis-i-vis its partners. Whether or not one is oppos-
ed to the nuclear weapon, it is still today a crite-
rion of state power. It is still a factor of indepen-
dence, too.
(c) The United Kngdam positian
111. There is no major problem in this respect in
the United Kingdom which is also a nuclear
power thanks to its possession of American Tri-
dent missiles which equip its nuclear submarines.
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Public opinion in Britain is also susceptible in this
matter. Moreover, Franco-British co-operation in
questions of nuclear doctrine has made great pro-
gress since 1992 as the French Prime Minister,
Alain Jupp6, recently noted: o'the two countries
are closer than they had originally hoped'0 ".
ll2. The Anglo-French Commission, the Joint
Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine,
which was established in autumn 1992 and given
a permanent status n 1993, has indeed proved to
be a useful instrument in improving relations
between the two countries in military nuclear mat-
ters. A review by this Joint Commission of the
compatibility of the deterrence doctrines of both
countries led to the conclusion that there is no
irreconcilable gap between the British " flexible
response'o and the French oo weak against the
strong " doctrine.
113. The European dimension of deterrence as
seen by each of the Western European nuclear
states has also been discussed in this Commission.
A joint projecq however, to develop a long distance
air-to-ground missile has been abandoned by the
United Kingdom because of budget ovemrns for
the Trident 2 D-5 missiles which will equip the
new strategic submarines. At present, the Joint
Commission is reviewing the r6le of deterrence in
relation to new security risks, including mass des-
truction weapons which could be deployed by
states with unstable political structures.
ll4. It should clearly be noted, however, that in
the agenda of the Joint Commission there is as yet
no question of joint patrols by strategic sub-
marines from both countries or joint targeting. It
is said that for the United Kingdom, the participa-
tion of France in NATO's Nuclear Planning
Group is a preliminary question before a discus-
sion on such far-reaching co-operation could start.
115. It should also be noted that the United
Kingdom does not see any room for a new deter-
rent organisation in Europe outside NAIO 3'.
(d) The reofiion of the European Union
116. The formal Council meeting of the fifteen
ministers for foreign affairs held in Santander
(Spain) did not reach even a minimum consensus
on this question. The meeting ended on 10th Sep-
tember and revealed differences between neutral
countries which were reticent about the question
of European defence (and therefore a fortiori
about the nuclear question) and countries wishing
to build a political Europe through a CFSP to-
gether with a coflrmon defence system. Also, the
summit meeting of heads of state and of govern-
30. Defense News, llth-l7th September 1995.
31. Prime Minister John Major, in an interview in Le
Monde, 29th-30th October 1995.
ment in Majorca, in the Balearic islands, on22nd
and 23rd September allowed no specific progress
to be made in this matter.
tl7 . It seems that the polemic atmosphere created
by the French nuclear tests is not favourable for
starting the debate on concerted deterrence before
all tess have been finished and the comprehensive
test ban treaty (CTBT) has been signed.
VI. The develapment of a European
defence identity and concerted deterrence
118. In the post-cold war world, new relation-
ships between old allies are inevitably taking
shape, and it is no secret that Europe will have to
do more for its own security, even if at this
moment, or in the foreseeable future, there is no
question of disbanding the Atlantic Alliance
which for so many years has been and still conti-
nues to be the bedrock of European security.
tl9. The development of a European defence
identity requires the establishment of a complete
common security and, in time, defence policy.
The r6le and future of these weapons in such a
European security and defence policy can certain-
ly not be ignored with two Western European
states having a nuclear arsenal at their disposal.
120. In this framework, it should also be taken
into consideration that the continuing existence of
a United States nuclear umbrella against the threat
of a massive armed attack on Western Europe is
less relevant today than during the cold war. Even
though uncertainties persist as regards develop-
ments in Russia with its still impressive nuclear
forces, there is no doubt that the threat from the
East has largely diminished. This change of
context should be a stimulant for new thinking in
the field of deterrence and the specilic r6le of the
French and British nuclear forces, bearing in mind
that the United States nuclear forces will continue
to play a major r6le in the defence strategy of the
Atlantic Alliance.
I2l. It is important to understand that a slow and
considered approach is necessary in these ques-
tions. The European countries concerned should
adopt a policy of small steps as the European ins-
titutions did successfully in other areas. A slow
approach should not lead to immobility, however.
Small steps should not result in marking time
which would be highly prejudicial for the defence
of Europe. To do nothing in this matter would not
help to define the European defence identity and
would thus jeopardise the corlmon defence plans
provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. A direction
for the years to come must therefore be chosen if
any steps at all are to be taken. The question is
simple: should concerted steps be taken by the
countries of the Union for a European deterrent
and, if so, by what ways and means?
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I22. Since, according to the Maastricht Treaty,
WEU's task is to develop a European defence
identity, it is particularly concerned with the debate
on a European deterrence since this would be a
component part of corlmon defence. France sug-
gests that this still vague identiry must inevitably
include a concerted nuclear strategy, but it is
noted here that the French proposal for concerted
deterrence is also rather vague. Before any discus-
sion on this issue could start, France should pre-
sent more specific ideas and provide more details
regarding its own ideas on this issue. Clearly
WEU would be the ideal cenffe for concerting the
European approach; NATO would be the body for
links with the United States. This would be what
might be called constructive complementarity.
123. The strategic problem is twofold: on the
one hand, France's redefinition of the notion of
vital interests and the concept of sanctuarising the
national territory which are the criteria for com-
mitting its nuclear weapons, and, on the other, the
positioning of this concerted deterrence in regard
to NAIO.
124. France will indeed have to redefine the vital
interests which govern the use of its nuclear deter-
rent force. Quite naturally, the vital interests
nuclear weapons are supposed to protect are in the
first place connected with the integrity of national
territory. Over the years, this very strict notion of
national interests has been gradually extended and
at present there can be little doubt that the French
doctrine does not apply exclusively to its national
territory in the strictest sense. Aggression against
Germany, for example, could just as well call in
question the vital interests of France. With the
increasingly intensifying social, economic and
political links between European states creating an
unprecedented interdependence, there is therefore
a need to clar$ and redefine the notion of vital
interests and to find a definition of what might be
the European common interest that might be
defended by French nuclear weapons. In this res-
pect, firm backing may be found in Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty, which stipulates that: " If
any of the high contracting parties should be the
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high
contacting parties will... afford the party so attack-
ed all the military and other aid and assistance in
their power. " This article seems to imply that
France and the United Kingdom could be led to
make use of their nuclear deterrent force in the
event of an attack on one of the other states party to
the treaty. Article V of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty would therefore seem to contain all the elements
for circumscribing what might be covered by the
notion of common European interest in the frame-
work of thinking on concerted deterrence.
125. Concerted deterrence also raises problems
in regard to the place it would take in relation to
the American deterrent instituted in the frame-
work of NATO. Would there not be a super-
imposition of nuclear umbrellas between the one
offered by the United States and the United King-
dom in the framework of NAIO and another one
which could be offered by France?
126. On 6th September 1995, in his speech to
the Institut des hautes 6tudes de d6fense nationale(IHEDN), the French Prime Minister, Alain
Jupp6, discreetly made it understood that Paris
was no longer opposed to discussing in NATO, or
at least in a renovated NATO, its independent
nuclear force.
127. To that end, he recalled that " the American
presence is and will remain essential for our secu-
rity " and even mentioned the possibility of French
participation in a discussion on nuclear deterrence
in the Atlantic Alliance, which would be a change
in the attitude adopted since 1966; thus he stated
that " French doctrine is built on the model of
deterrence of the strong by the weak. This is what
is known in mathematics as a borderline case
because it does not take account, inter alia, of our
membership of alliances. I believe that at a time
when we are setting our sights on the achievement
of a common defence policy with our European
partners, including the United Kingdom, while
working to renovate the transatlantic link, we
must learn to introduce the collective dimension
as a factor of our doctrine. "
128. It is therefore clear for the French Prime
Minister that the emergence of concerted deter-
rence in a European defence system would in no
way call in question the American nuclear protec-
tion to which Germany and the United Kingdom
are very attached. For him, a nuclear deterrent
force protecting the vital interests of Europe
might be included in the relevant NATO iurange-
ments. This nevertheless implies a redefinition of
ttre position of European states within that alliance
and particularly of France, which withdrew in
1966. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that
the Americans may lose their pre-eminent posi-
tion as regards nuclear deterrence within the
alliance. Understandably, France may not agree to
link its deterrent force to NATO without having
the benefit of decision-making powers regarding
its commitment. This desire to keep a degree of
independence is confrmed by the political dimen-
sion of the resumption of French nuclear tests at
the present juncture. Everything rests on a redefi-
nition of the place of France and of its deterrent
force in regard to the alliance. One may have to
think in terms of the need for a new deal in this
respect. It may thus be understood that Europeans
will not build up a joint defence under the protec-
tion of a concerted nuclear deterrence without the
United States. NAIO remains the essential instru-
ment for discussion and co-ordination between
effective United States protection and the emer-
gence of concerted European deterrence.
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AEC
Aidx 2
Blank frings
Concerted deterrence
CTBT
DIRCEN
ECJ
Euratom
IAEA
ICJ
II{EDN
Laser m6gajoule (LMJ)
APPENDIX
Glassary
Atomic Energy Commissariat. French organisation dealing with
nuclear questions, particularly the military applications of nuclear
research.
Project currently being carried out by the CEA (French Atomic
Energy Commissariat) for a high penefration X-ray generator to be
located at Vaujours-Moronvilliers. This radiographic facility is
essential for blank frings. It enables very detailed analyses to be
made of instability problems in chain reactions that arise during
priming of detonators.
Tests ca:ried out without nuclear material. These cannot at present
replace full-scale tests. Observation of phenomena produced during
these tests will be made possible thanks to Airix 2, the future French
high penetration X-ray generator.
Proposal made by the kesident of France, Mr. Jacques Chirac, for
discussing the extension of the French nuclear guarantee and a
common nuclear docftine with his European partners. Concerted
deterrence cannot be equated either with shared deterrence where
all countries taking part would have a " finger on the trigger " on
the same basis as France or " extended deterrence which would
merely extend the guarantee ".
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Treaty placing a complete ban on
nuclear testing. France is commined to signing after conducting its
final series of tests. The treaty has been negotiated in the framework
of the Disarmament Conference which has set 1996 as deadline.
Direction des Centres d'Experimentation Nucl6aires. A Frenchjoint services/AEC body tasked with preparing and carrying out
measures for the operation of devices. It therefore used the French
test facilities in the South Pacific.
European Court of Justice.
European treaty signed on 25th March 1957 qeating the EAEC
(European Atomic Energy Community); it entered into force on
lst January 1958 at the same time as the Treaty of Rome founding
the former EEC; Euratom is concerned only with civilian nuclear
questions.
International Atomic Energy Agency. International organisation
with responsibility, inter alia, for supervising compliance with non
proliferation norns.
International Court of Justice.
Institut des hautes 6tudes de d6fense nationale. A high-level French
education and training institute on contemporary sfiategic and mili-
tary problems.
French ultra high power laser project for simulating nuclear explo-
sions using thermonuclear micro-explosion techniques. The AEC
plans to locate it in Aquitaine; a co-operative project with the
United States is under consideration.
Period during which a state agrees to abstain from nuclear testing,
often through a declaration or promise placing it in the legal cate-
gory of unilateral acts, legally enforceable against that state should
it fail to comply with their terms. France observed a moratorium on
nuclear testing between Apil1992 and June 1995.
Moratorium
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Moscow Treaty
M-45
NPT
OMTC
oT (roM)
PALEN Programme
PTC
Reganne 
- 
In Ecker
SOF
Thermonuclear
TN.75
I.JNSCEAR
Treaty signed by the United States, the USSR and the United
Kingdom on 5th August 1963 on the banning of nuclear testing in
the atrnosphere, in space and under water, France refused to accede
to it.
French missile which is to carry the TN-75 warhead. The future
SOP strategic nuclear submarines will each be equipped with
16 such missiles.
Non-proliferation Treaty. Treaty initially concluded in 1968
(coming into force in 1970) for a 25-year period. 178 counmies
ratified it (France and China in 1992). A conference held from
18th April to 12th May extended it indefinitely. The treaty restricts
the states authorised to possess nuclear weapons to five; however it
provides for compensation for non-nuclear states.
Oasis Military Test Cenffe. Name given to the Sahara test site at [n
Ecker in the Hogg*, where France conducted some of its first
nuclear tests.
Overseas Territory. Part of French tenitory with some independence.
Such territories have an administrative Assembly. French Polynesia
is in this category.
Programme of adjustment to the limitation of nuclear testing. This
French scientific prograrnme is intended to simulate nuclear tests so
that full-scale testing need no longer be carried out. From a techno-
logical point of view it uses highly sophisticated radiological tech-
niques essential for blank testing (Airix 2), high-power pulse gene-
rators and extremely powerful computers.
Pacific Test Cenfre. This is the complex in French Polynesia in the
South Pacific where nuclear testing is carried out. The tests are
conducted on the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls (forming part of
the atolls of Tuamutu).
Sites in the Sahara chosen by France for carrying out its first
nuclear tests.
Strategic Ocean Force. A force made up of French nuclear missile-
launching submarines forming a very important part of French
nuclear deterrent forces. Future Triumphant-class submarines will
cNry M-45 missiles with TN-75 nuclear warheads.
Refers to the fusion reaction produced by the hydrogen bomb. The
frst French test of this type was held in Fangataufa (French Poly-
nesia) on2AthAugust 1968 (atmospheric test); the TN-75 is a ther-
monuclear weapon.
TN = tOte nucl6aire. The TN-75 is the latest French nuclear
warhead, to be carried by the M-45 missile that will arm the future
French Triumphant-class nuclear missile-launching submarines.
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation. United Nations body with the task, inter alia, of receiv-
ing, studying and verifying all documents transmitted by states in
connection with nuclear tests.
Makes it possible to check, by means of full-scale nuclear tests, that
scientistst calculations actually produce the forecast effect. For the
time being, nuclear tests are the only means France has of vali-
dating its calculations (until a fulI test simulation programme is pro-
duced). A nuclear weapon is described as o'qualified " when all cal-
culations involved in ils manufacture have been validated and it is
ready for mass production. A weapon is validated when it is totally
reliable.
Validation
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